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ABSTRACT
Low Power Wide Area Network (LPWAN) technologies like the
Long Range Wide Area Network (LoRaWAN) standard provide the
foundation of applications realizing communication and intelligent
interaction between almost any kind of object. These applications
are commonly called Smart Cities and the Internet of Things (IoT).
Offering the potential of great benefits for mankind, these appli-
cations can also present a significant risk, especially when their
security is compromised. This paper’s work analyzes the possibility
of two particular scenarios of impersonating a LoRaWAN gateway
combining existing attacks. Impersonated gateways are of use when
exploiting vulnerabilities already shown by other researchers. We
give a basic overview about LoRaWAN, the Semtech Packet For-
warder protocol, attacks needed to perform the impersonation, and
assumptions made. We explain our attack and propose countermea-
sures to increase the security of LoRaWAN networks. We show a
gateway impersonation is possible in particular circumstances but
can be detected and prevented.
1 INTRODUCTION
Services and applications making use of data from and the interac-
tion of everyday objects and devices, not necessarily electronic ones,
grow in importance. The research and advisory company Gartner
Inc. predicts that the number of objects or devices connected to the
Internet will reach 25 billion by 2020[3]. Smart City and IoT are
terms, which describe the goals behind using these applications and
services. LPWAN technologies like LoRaWAN provide the fabric to
solutions implementing smart grids, sensor networks, and other ap-
plications realizing these goals. SK Telecom, a telecommunication
company in South-Korea offers a nationwide LoRaWAN network[2].
The crowd-sourced project called The Things Network (TTN) offers
a public, international, and non-commercial LoRaWAN. Hence we
can gather LoRaWAN will affect the everyday life of many people
in the future and its security therefore is of great importance for
society.
There has been security centered research on many parts of Lo-
RaWAN, e.g. attacking communication and availability of end de-
vices. One attack we find in this research is ACK spoofing as pro-
posed by Yang[17]. This attack proves that gateways can be used
to pretend the reception of messages without actually forwarding
them. It uses a malicious gateway, controlled by an attacker. How-
ever, only briefly indications about adding a malicious gateway or
infiltrating present gateways are presented to achieve them. The
aim of this analysis is to propose and examine a new approach
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enabling an attacker to use another gateway to mimic the behav-
ior of a non malicious one, while disabling the real gateway. This
approach consists of two scenarios, where a gateway is disabled,
either by disconnecting it, or by leveraging the jamming with com-
modity LoRaWAN hardware as shown by Aras et al[1]. We then use
limitations, traces of the attacks, and common security technologies
to propose countermeasures against the attack.
As LoRaWAN offers flexibility in the use of upper layer protocols,
a scenario has to be specified resembling existing applications. For
gateway to server communication the Semtech Packet Forwarder
Protocol is used and an example gateway registration process is
derived from TTN, explained on the organization’s website.
To investigate the possibility of a gateway impersonation we com-
bine the works of Yang[17], Miller et al.[7], and Aras et al.[1] and
extend themwith examining the specifications of LoRaWAN [6] and
the Semtech Packet Forwarder Protocol [8] as well as instructions
publicly available on TTN’s websites. The results though will have
to be tested in practical conditions to evaluate effort and probability
of success.
This paper consists of 5 parts. We give a brief overview about the
LoRaWAN protocol and the LoRa modulation in Section 2. Since
the LoRaWAN specification does not define how gateways should
be connected to network servers, we describe the Semtech Packet
Forwarder Protocol and an example gateway registration process
as well. In Section 3 we summarize different attacks done by other
researchers. First we take a look at attacks making use of malicious
gateways. Thenwe describe howmessages can be jammed, recorded
and resent later or at other locations. In Section 4 we describe our
impersonation approach. Further we propose two possible ways
to disable legitimate gateways and explain their impersonation
step by step. Resorting to findings in Sections 4 we recommend
countermeasures against gateway impersonation in Section 5. Con-
cluding, we summarize this papers findings and approaches for
further investigations in Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND
This section gives an introduction to LoRaWAN and related tech-
nologies, needed to understand the attack approach. These include
the LoRamodulation scheme, the gateway registration process from
TTN and the Semtech Packet Forwarder Protocol.
2.1 LoRaWANTM
LoRaWAN is an open specification developed by the LoRa Alliance.
It defines a communication protocol for a scenario involving de-
vices distributed over a large area with the constraint of minimizing
the end device’s energy consumption, enabling devices to last on
regular batteries for years. The constraint results in smaller data
rates between 0.3 and 50 Kilobit per second, useful in situations
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where mostly sensory and controlling communication takes place.
This is the case for many applications like Smart Cities and indus-
trial automation. While the protocol is open to public development,
LoRa, the physical modulation used for transmitting LoRaWAN
radio messages, is intellectual property of Semtech.
LoRaWAN’s network topology follows a star of stars pattern, as
Figure 1: LoRaWAN network topology
shown in Figure 1. The network server, as a central point, is the
hub, all LoRaWAN data is exchanged over. On the one side it is
connected to servers running applications using data from a Lo-
RaWAN. These do not have to be physical servers but could also
be virtual machines or applications running on the network server.
On the other side it communicates to remote base-stations called
gateways. How these connections are accomplished is not part of
the specification, suggesting commonly used IP connections and
related upper layer protocols for this purpose. Gateways are sta-
tionary LoRa-transceivers receiving uplink radio messages from
the end devices and sending the demodulated data to the network
server. These transmissions are mostly data for applications and
requests to join a network. Gateways are also used for downlink
messages from application or network servers, needed for config-
uring devices. Although LoRaWAN communication is bidirectional,
uplink traffic from end devices to application servers is considered
predominant.
The specification offers different modes of operation, which can
present another task for gateways. To reduce power consumption,
devices in Class A networks have only two short receiving win-
dows after transmitting an uplink message, offering the gateway
an opportunity to transmit downlink messages to a device. In Class
B networks a gateway regularly sends out time synchronized bea-
cons, which open additional device receiving windows. In Class C
networks, continuous reception of messages by devices is possible,
increasing the power consumption and leading to a corresponding
decrease of lifespan.
To establish confidentiality of the data and integrity of the mes-
sages, cryptography is used. At first an application key is created on
the application server and placed on every device destined for the
same. Two session keys are derived from it, when a device enters
the network. One serves as the application session key protecting
the confidentiality of the message payload between end device and
application server. The other is used as network session key pro-
tecting the integrity of messages between end device and network
server, respectively present on both.
Nonces, the concept of numbers only used once, are utilized in
various cases, e.g. sequential counters for uplink and downlink
messages, preventing replay attacks in certain scenarios, but also
offering possibilities for denial of service attacks during the net-
work joining procedure, as shown Tomasin et al[16].
The radio channels used for LoRaWAN communication are located
in different ISM-Bands depending on the regulation authority re-
sponsible for the network’s area. Resulting from this, parameters
like transmission power and duty cycle differ. For this paper we
assume European regulations, though the findings apply for other
regulation areas as well. Aside from this, network provider poli-
cies and the LoRaWAN specification define additional limits for
certain aspects of the protocol[14]. Since the ISM-Bands require no
licensing fees for using, there can be interference caused by other
radio signals. Therefore LoRaWAN makes use of cyclic redundancy
checks (CRC) to protect the physical integrity of the payload[6].
2.2 The LoRa modulation
The modulation used for LoRaWAN is based on Chirp spread spec-
trum (CSS), i.e. the modulation uses the whole bandwith of the
communication channel by encoding a message in sequences of
chirps, which are either ascending or descending linear changes
in frequency. This makes it resistant to noise, which is important
when communicating in ISM bands, as these are less regulated,
leading to more communication and possible interference[9].
Also colliding messages do not necessarily lead to message loss, but
can be received simultaneously with different spreading factors[1].
The spreading factor describes how many physical elements are
used for transmission of a symbol. This means, a higher spreading
factor uses more physical space, e.g. bandwidth or as in LoRa’s case
time duration, to transmit the same information. The spreading
is what makes a message more resistant to interferences, but also
reduces the transmission speed as a message will be longer.
To get a grasp of how the chirps in LoRa messages are structured,
a visual representation of the frequency spectrum can be seen in
Figure 2 created by Knight and Seeber[5].
2.3 Gateway registration
Registering gateways to networks is not a necessity demanded by
LoRaWAN. For example TTN is accepting traffic even of unregis-
tered Semtech Packet Forwarder Gateways. However in this case
the gateway and traffic are marked as untrusted. Registering gate-
ways is a common practice, since it can provide an overview of
the network, but also be necessary if gateways use more complex
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Figure 2: Spectrogram excerpt of a LoRa chirp y-axis: Time,
x-axis: Frequency | taken from [5]
packet forwarders requiring configuration, e.g. depositing crypto-
graphic keys. For this paper a registration process that is similar
to TTN’s is presumed. After creating an account on the organiza-
tion’s website, a gateway can be registered by entering data into a
form. The requested information includes the geographic location,
whether the Antenna is placed indoors or outdoors, the frequencies
used, a short description, the unique gateway identifier and the
protocol that is used for packet forwarding, i.e. the transmission of
radio packets from gateway to network server[15].
The organization supports two types of protocols. Packet For-
warders using the Gateway Connector Protocol, developed in par-
allel with the TTN Packet Forwarder, have to be registered since
they require further configuration. Although the protocol is still
supported, by the time of writing this paper the development of
the packet forwarder was put on hold [13].
The other protocol supported is the Semtech Packet Forwarder
Protocol. When registering a gateway of this type, a Device EUI
of 8 bytes length can be taken from the gateways LoRa module,
or generated otherwise. It then has to be entered during registra-
tion on the website as well as the local configuration file of the
Semtech Packet Forwarder or another using the same protocol. Af-
ter configuring location information, the gateway is visible on the
official map on the website. When registration is finished a gateway
can send traffic that is not marked untrusted, using the registered
EUI[15].
2.4 Semtech Packet Forwarder Protocol
Packet forwarders are applications running on gateways. They take
care of sending demodulated radio packets arriving at the gateway
to a network server and transmitting packets coming from the same
via a built in LoRa transceiver. The LoRaWAN specification does
not provide a protocol or specific implementation to use, since the
scope of LoRaWAN is to provide a flexible foundation to applica-
tions.
The protocol for Semtech Packet Forwarder is historically the first
gateway connection protocol and was developed by Semtech Corpo-
ration who maintain it. The Semtech Packet Forwarder Protocol is
not recommended for production use and explicitly developed with-
out authentication [8]. However this packet forwarder is still used in
many commodity gateways [12]. TTN offers a public map of all gate-
ways deployed in their networks, showing the devices names [11].
Given the practice that names of devices using this protocol are vis-
ible on the map with prefix "eui-" and the gateway identifier, many
gateways using this protocol can be seen, despite being considered
unsafe by Semtech Corporation and TTN[15]. Current gateway data
from TTN used for generating the map can be obtained in JSON
format from the url "https://www.thethingsnetwork.org/gateway-
data/". When accessing the data on 23rd March 2019, of 6869 gate-
way entries present in the dataset, which had been last seen after
20th March 2019, 4968 had an "eui-" prefix. Given this informa-
tion, it can be assumed the majority of gateways in TTN are using
Semtech’s protocol. We can therefore reason, an attack requiring
the assumptions made is relevant in real world scenarios. At the
same time, the website stated there were "6646 gateways up and
running", so there might be additional factors TTN uses for detect-
ing the functionality of a gateway.
Semtech’s packet forwarding is based on the connectionless User
Datagram Protocol (UDP). Messages are sent to the application
listening on the server with IP-address and port number specified
in the destination fields of the datagram. Also source fields with
IP-address and port number of the sending application exist. There
are no mechanisms in the form of acknowledgment or retransmis-
sion to avoid packet loss. Therefore applications using the protocol
should be anticipating data loss and prepare for it [4].
Since LoRaWAN traffic is suspected to be mostly consisting of
uplink traffic, it comes as no surprise that uplink and downlink
messages are handled differently in the Semtech Protocol[6].
2.4.1 Uplink communication. For an uplink message to be sent,
a radio packet addressed to the gateway must arrive at the gate-
way’s transceiver. After a specified number of packets arrived, the
forwarder initiates communication by sending a PUSH_DATA mes-
sage to the server, composed as seen in Table 1. The gateway’s
Bytes Function
0 protocol version
1-2 random PUSH_ACK token
3 PUSH_DATA identifier (0x00)
4-11 Gateway identifier
12-end JSON-like payload
Table 1: PUSH_DATA message
identifier is supposed to be the 64 Bit EUI from the LoRa transceiver
module on the gateway but can be set to any 8-byte string in the
gateway’s configuration. The payload is encoded in base64 and
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Figure 3: Packet Forwarder Protocol uplink sequence dia-
gram
encapsulated in a JSON-like object containing status information
as well. Of special interest is the "stat" field, presenting information
about the CRC checksum. This field can have the values 1, for a
correct checksum, -1, for an incorrect one, and 0 if no checksum is
used.
If the PUSH_DATA message is received by the network server, a
PUSH_ACK message is returned containing the PUSH_ACK token.
This is only used for network quality measurements, packets are
not retransmitted if no PUSH_ACK message arrives at the gateway
[8]. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.
2.4.2 Downlink communication. As gateways can be connected
to network servers with a lot of different technologies, it is probable
that some connections involve network address translation, which
keeps a server from initially sending a message to the gateway.
However since this behavior is needed, the protocol regularly sends
PULL_DATA messages to the server to open a route to the gateway
and at the same time informing the server about the open route. The
structure of these messages can be seen in Table 2. After acknowl-
Bytes Function
0 protocol version
1-2 random token
3 PULL_DATA identifier (0x02)
4-11 Gateway identifier
Table 2: PULL_DATA message
edging the PULL_DATA message the server is now able to send
PULL_RESP packets downlink. Theses packets include the physical
payload that the gateway transmits to the end device via transceiver.
If a transmission to the gateway is successful, the gateway responds
with a TX_ACK message, shown in Table 3, optionally containing
a JSON object with status information about the transmission.
Bytes Function
0 protocol version
1-2 same token as the PULL_RESP packet
3 TX_ACK identifier (0x05)
4-11 Gateway identifier
12-end JSON status-payload
Table 3: TX_ACK message
A sequence diagram showing the explained excerpt of downlink
communication is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Packet Forwarder Protocol downlink sequence di-
agram
3 RELATEDWORK
In this section we describe two attacks which a gateway under an
attackers control can realize. Afterwards we will provide a short
summary of the attacks we leverage to disable gateways before
impersonating.
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3.1 Malicious Gateways
An attacker having control over gateways poses a threat to Lo-
RaWANs, as every gateway includes a transceiver enabling it to
constantly listen for messages and sending the same as well. These
capabilities already enable a lot of attacks, where these technical
capabilities are required. Some of these attacks are described in
the works of Yang [17], and Aras et al[1]. However there are two
attacks, where the role of a gateway is required for the attack, or at
least suggests itself.
3.1.1 Beacon spoofing. Robert Miller describes an attack that
can be achieved just by a using a regular transmitter capable of
sending LoRa Messages[7]. For the attack to work it is however
necessary a Class B LoRaWAN is used, which provides a new task
to gateways. We explain millers attack therefore with an attacking
gateway, although regular end devices could be used as well, since
the beacons are neither integrity protected, nor signed and can
therefore be spoofed by any attacker able to send high power LoRa
messages.
When a network is running in Class B mode of operation, the
gateway sends out beacons, small radio packets presenting time
synchronization and location information. It lets end devices open
additional receiving windows for downlink messages in regular
intervals, despite the two windows that are already opened after
an uplink message. This decreases delays, as downlink messages
can be sent more frequently.
By sending out beacons randomly a malicious gateway could desyn-
chronize an end device from receiving windows of another gateway.
This could cause a denial of service, as the legitimate gateway sends
messages when the end device is not receiving. This can also be
adapted to increase power consumption of end devices and lower-
ing their lifespan. In this case, the beacon frequency is increased,
opening more receiving windows than necessary, wasting energy.
Even indirect manipulation of data is possible with the transmission
of wrong location data in the false beacon especially relevant, if the
end device is not stationary[7].
3.1.2 ACK spoofing. The arrival of LoRaWAN uplink messages
at the network server is not confirmed to the end device by default.
In certain applications it is useful to have these kind of acknowledg-
ments for end devices, so packet loss can be detected and messages
can be retransmitted. To make this possible, LoRaWAN has so called
uplink confirmed messages, that trigger the network server to send
a packet to the end device acknowledging the reception of the mes-
sage. This packet is called ACK. In Table 4, the messages structure of
a LoRaWAN message is shown. In the frame control byte the third
most significant bit is set, if the message is an acknowledgment[6].
For the following attack, the frame counter (FCnt) is of interest. Its
Bytes Function
0 message header
1-4 device address
5 frame control byte
6-7 frame counter
8-11 message authentication code
Table 4: LoRaWAN ACK message
purpose is to indicate, that the last message sent has arrived at the
server and it is increased every time, an ACK is sent down to the
specific device. The ACK is only accepted, if FCnt is larger than the
last one, the device received. As FCnt acts as a sequential Nonce and
a message authentication code, created with the network session
key, is attached, an attacker can neither create a valid new ACK,
nor replay an already used one.
Yang proves this to be a design flaw, posing a security threat if an
attacker has control over a gateway[17]. This attack abuses the fact,
that FCnt does not specify the message that should be acknowl-
edged. In case of an attacker controlling the gateway, the ACK for a
message can be held back at the gateway. Since the end device now
believes the message got lost, it will retransmit the message a few
times, but finally assume the message got lost. The next message,
the device is requesting an acknowledgment for, is now be dropped
at the gateway. The gateway can now send the ACK recorded for
the message before, to pretend the message was received. From the
perspective of the device, the lost message is received, while the
received message is lost[17].
As of LoRaWAN version 1.1, the frame counter of the message to
be acknowledged, is incorporated into calculation of the acknowl-
edgment’s message integrity code[6]. This way, the spoofing is
detected by failure of integrity verification. This effectively pre-
vents the attack for all end devices operating only with this version.
3.2 Triggered jamming, selective jamming, and
wormhole attack
We now have stated what an attacker is able to do, when in control
of a gateway. In order to achieve the impersonation, additional
attacks are needed. Aras et al. explain different approaches to jam-
ming LoRaWANs using commodity LoRaWAN devices[1]. We use
some of these approaches to develop the impersonation.
3.2.1 constant jamming of a channel. The easiest approach to
jamming is simply placing a LoRa transmitter sending a constant
signal of high power next to the target. This will constantly prevent
any connection on the channel by drowning any incoming message.
This however can be easily detected by network operators and
prevented by switching to a different channel[1].
3.2.2 triggered jamming of a channel. Another approach uses a
utility many devices provide, although this behavior is not required
by the LoRaWAN standard: To avoid collisions LoRa modules can
detect, whether a message is transmitted on a channel at a point in
time. The device can now use this information to send messages,
when the communication channel is not occupied by the message
of another device. Obviously this can be used conversely to collide
a random LoRa message with a legitimate message from another
device. This is harder to detect than constant jamming[1].
3.2.3 selective jamming of a device. The idea of triggered jam-
ming can be improved by using two LoRa devices and sophisticated
scanning. One device is close to the sender, scanning the message’s
Frame Header for the Device Address (DevAddr) of the targets.
When a message with a targets DevAddr is received at the scanning
device, a faster communication channel is used to trigger the sec-
ond device close to the receiver, to start jamming the transmission
by sending a high power LoRa message arriving at the receiver
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roughly at the same time of the actual message. Depending on the
speed of the connection used between the attacking devices, this
will mostly affect bits at the end of the legitimate LoRa message,
where mostly checksums and message integrity codes are located.
As the jamming operation only takes place when a message is sent
by specific devices, it is even harder to detect than triggered jam-
ming and can be misinterpreted as a checksum failure caused by
noise or bad conditions[1].
3.2.4 selective jamming with wormhole attack. Combining se-
lective jamming with a wormhole attack can enable an attacker to
pretend that a device is still operating correctly while it is not. First
a selective jamming attack is performed regularly only this time,
the message is not only scanned but recorded. Only after success-
fully finishing recording the message, the scanning device triggers
the jamming device over the faster connection. This sets further
timing constraints as now, not only DevAddr has to be received
completely, but also the rest of the message, before jamming can
begin. However the attack is still feasible if bigger spreading factors
are in use since longer messages resulting from a bigger spreading
factor are transmitted slower. After recording the messages they
can be replayed, as the validity of messages is not depending on the
time they were sent. Therefore the messages could also be replayed
by another device or at another gateway[1].
4 IMPERSONATING GATEWAYS
The goal of impersonated gateways is to pave the way for ACK
spoofing described by Yang et al[17]. Therefore what we are try-
ing to achieve from a security objectives perspective is, to attack
the availability of the end devices. To achieve this we also attack
the integrity of messages to gateways as well as the availability of
gateways themselves. The basic concept of the attack is:
(1) The attacked gateway’s unique identifier is obtained.
(2) The attacked gateway is disabled, i.e. no communication
from end devices via the gateway is successful anymore.
(3) The malicious gateway is configured by the attacker to use
the legitimate gateway’s unique identifier for communicat-
ing with the network server.
(4) The ACK spoofing attack is conducted.
There exist several possible ways to enact each of the four steps
and they are influencing each other. As a result, an attacker has
to achieve several tasks in different ways, further explained in the
following sections. We examine these tasks in two groups. First
we take a look at possibilities to disable gateways, their prerequi-
sites and their applicability. The choice, which way is used affects
the second group of tasks. These tasks are dealing with the imple-
mentation of gateway impersonation itself and therefore they are
approached separately.
4.1 Disabling gateways
Disabling the legitimate gateway is an important condition for
impersonation for ACK spoofing attacks. If working gateways are
covering the area of the target end device, the malicious one can
be circumvented. Two ways are proposed to achieve the disabling
of a gateway.
4.1.1 Physical access. A simple approach to disabling a gateway
is the disconnection from its power source or network connection.
This requires both knowledge about the location and access to the
power source or respectively the network connection.
While the latter is depending on physical protection measures,
which are out of this paper’s scope, we can at least provide several
options in our scenario to obtain location information. Besides
online maps of service providers showing gateway locations as
TTN is providing publicly on their website, there is also an aspect
of the LoRaWAN protocol, leaking information about the location
of gateways[11]. Networks running in Class B mode are sending
out beacons, as explained before. These contain GPS information
of the gateway, in order to enable end devices to correctly adapt
when switching between coverage areas of different gateways. Since
beacons are not confidentiality protected, any receiver listening to
the beacon frequency and able to decode LoRa messages can obtain
this location information[7].
4.1.2 Jamming. Another approach of disabling a gateway is
an adaption of the selective jamming attack as described by Aras
et al[1]. Fulfilling the aim to disable the gateway, what has to be
achieved in this case is the stop of uplink communication to the
gateway. Later a replay of the communication at our malicious gate-
way has to be enacted, so it appears to the server as if the network
is operating well, while actually the attacker is performing ACK
spoofing or other attacks.
For this attack, it is not possible to use constant jamming, as this
would clog the communication channel and therefore make it im-
possible to use the channel for recording messages.
When evaluating different jamming approaches triggered jamming
at first comes to mind, as it is the simplest of advanced jamming
techniques. Triggered jamming enables the attacker to stop all
uplink communication. The concerns of detecting the triggered
jamming are less grave in this scenario, despite the fact that all
devices in range are jammed, since the gateway is impersonated
and the jammed messages are replayed later, simulating normal
behavior of the network[1]. Still triggered jamming probably is not
the best fit in this case, as the collision of messages is caused as
soon as possible and therefore the collision of the jammer might
not only affect the legitimate gateway but also recordings of the
attacker.
Hypothetically, if recording and jamming device are located far
enough from each other it might be possible to use the triggered
approach for the jammer, abandoning the connection between both
devices. Since triggered jamming is usually more successful in dis-
turbing data this change in procedure could enhance the effective-
ness of the attack, if at the same time the recording device is close
enough to the sender[1]. This however would have to be tested in
a realistic environment since it is highly dependent on timing and
physical parameters.
We find that selective jamming is the best fit, as it triggers jamming
only after the message was recorded successfully.
In case of the impersonation, the recording device can be replaced
with the malicious gateway. For this purpose modification is needed
to trigger the jammer after successful recording.
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4.2 Attack procedure
The process of impersonation is depending on how the legitimate
gateway has been disabled. In both situations, the essential part
is to spoof the gateway’s unique identifier used by the legitimate
gateway which in most cases should be registered at the network
provider.
4.2.1 Obtaining gateway identifiers. Gateway identifiers are not
treated as an asset to be securely stored, as they are even presented
as the device name on TTN’s homepage[11]. Chances are that
configuration files containing legitimate gateway identifiers might
also be found for example in code repositories on public networks.
Public sources are the first and easiest way to obtain identifiers.
Otherwise, there is still the option of sniffing a message containing
the identifier when it is sent to the network server by the gateway.
This poses a challenge, as an attacker has to be able to eavesdrop on
communication between gateway and server. This could be realized
since LoRaWAN does not specify this connection. The security of
the identifier during transmission is therefore directly depending
on the eavesdropping countermeasures used on lower levels of the
levels. E.g. if the network connection is an unsecured wireless LAN
connection, the identifier can be simply recorded using software
defined radio and an analysis tool for network traces. As only a
single message has to be recorded, this can be achieved very easy
if security measures are insufficient.
4.2.2 Disconnected gateways. For our disconnection scenario,
the only thing needed is a regular LoRa gateway. After obtaining
the identifier, it can be configured in the gateway’s local_conf.json
file. From there the packet forwarder will use the this identifier to
send uplink packets and will start receiving data for the disabled
gateway. After successfully disabling the legitimate gateway, there
is now only one gateway transmitting the messages, appearing to
the network server as legitimate. Enacting an ACK spoofing attack
as explained by Yang is now possible without any limitations[17].
4.2.3 Jammed gateways. When the communication to a gateway
is jammed, it is still receptive to messages, so a simple replaying for
our gateway while pausing the jamming is not possible. Choosing
a similar procedure to the selective approach, where a recording
device and a jammer are needed, the malicious gateway can also
be used as the recording device. This comes in handy, as replaying
messages can be omitted. Through this the gateway can directly
serve it’s purpose originally intended, sending packets to the net-
work server. For configuration, the gateway identifier again has
to be configured. However there has to be additional software in-
stalled on the gateway sending a triggering message to the jamming
device. This can be omitted if it can be confirmed in practice that
triggered jamming with the recording device located far enough
would suffice for the attack as explained in Section 4.1.2.
What happens next is depending on the handling of checksum fail-
ures by the legitimate gateway. If the CRC check fails, gateways
could decide to simply drop the package, reducing the number of in-
valid packets sent to the server. In practice it is more likely, network
operators are interested in a high number of failing CRC checksums.
As the Semtech Packet Forwarder Protocol can indicate a checksum
failure by the ’stat’ field in the payload meta data, mentioned in
Section 2.4.1, in this case it appears to the server as if about half of
Figure 5: impersonation attack disconnecting the gateway
the packets are corrupt. The intact half of the packets are sent over
the attackers gateway.
It is of course tempting to change the UDP source address field to
the original one, or apply IP spoofing, making the traffic seem to
come from the legitimate gateway. Since attacks using malicious
gateways, e.g. the ACK spoofing attack, are relying on receiving
messages from the server, this would make it very hard to enact
these attacks, as for this scenario to work, traffic to the original
IP would have to be rerouted to the attacker. This would make
the whole attack concept more sophisticated and less possible to
realize.
How network servers are handling acknowledge messages sent
downlink to the gateway, has to be answered by practical exper-
iments with existing network server implementations. In this sit-
uation two gateways would be sending PULL_DATA messages to
keep a path open for the server. They appear as one from a packet
forwarder protocol perspective, since the only way of identifying a
gateway in the protocol is the unique identifier. The network server
will have to make the choice which logical address is chosen as the
destination, to send the PULL_RESP packet containing the ACK. If
the legitimate address is chosen for the downlink, the attack fails.
One likely scenario is a network server choosing the IP address by
using the last PULL_DATA message that arrived at the network
server. Therefore the attacker can increase the frequency of the
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PULL_DATA messages. If a the server changes the downlink ad-
dress after seeing a new one in the packet, chances are higher that
the attackers address is chosen for sending acknowledge messages,
as it appears more often than the legitimate one.
Figure 6: impersonation attack using jamming
5 COUNTERMEASURES
Fortunately a multitude of counteractions can be taken to detect or
prevent this kind of impersonation attack. There are a lot of traces
that this attack leaves during execution. Also limitations exist, re-
sulting from the need for physical access and certain configurations
of gateways and network servers. In the following we describe
concepts to detect this attack using intrusion detection systems
(IDS). Also five different approaches are presented to either make
the attack harder to implement or even completely prevent it.
5.1 Detection
With the help of IDS, there are multiple traces to find when imper-
sonation is enacted. First of all, when the gateway is disconnected
and the malicious one is switched on, it appears to the server as
if the IP address has changed. Depending on the network connec-
tion type the gateway uses, this does not necessarily have to be an
indication for an impersonation, since Internet service providers
tend to change IP addresses of customers in regular intervals[10].
It can however be a recommending hint to closely observe further
behavior. Respectively an advanced network monitoring solution
with an endpoint installed on the gateway would immediately show
if it is disabled as a change in IP address would not affect the func-
tionality.
Changing IP addresses though are a clear sign for an impersonation
attack in the scenario of the jammed gateway. As it is assumed that
corrupted packets are still sent to the server with "stat" field set to
-1, there would be packet loss messages with the original source
IP and packets with correct payload coming from the attackers IP.
There is no natural scenario explaining this behavior.
Investigating communication on the packet forwarder level, there
are further inconsistencies in the case of jamming. An increase
in frequency of PULL_DATA messages can be detected, as now
two gateways are sending them. If the attacker wants to increase
chances for success, this effect is even stronger.
Assuming a gateway having no packet loss during normal oper-
ation, suddenly the rate of corrupted packets increases to about
50% if the malicious gateway is turned on simultaneously with the
jammer. This in conjunction with other traces can also be a good
indication for an attack proceeding.
5.2 Protection of gateways
Disabling gateways has to be prevented, therefore physical prepara-
tions are necessary. Gateways should be located in secure housings
and connected to a power source that is only accessible to trustwor-
thy persons[17]. If the area around the gateway is not accessible
to the public likewise, jamming messages to the gateway will be
less successful, as sending a signal with higher power has less im-
pact due to free space attenuation. The network connection has to
be stable and immune to disturbances. This suggests that cabled
connections should be preferred over wireless, cellular or other
radio based options. Also LoRa gateway EUIs should be treated
with more care, presenting them on a map or leaving them in open
repositories is discouraged.
5.3 Gateway redundancy
As soon as one functioning gateway is covering an end device,
wormhole and ACK spoofing attacks are rendered ineffective. Mes-
sages will be sent and received via the working gateway. LoRaWAN
uses sequential counters for plink and downlink messages so there
is no problem in the overlapping of gateways as a message that is re-
ceived again, it is simply dropped. Overlapping gateways in general
can help to improve availability and resistance against jamming[1].
5.4 Securing connection between gateway and
server
In general it can be recommended to not allow traffic from unreg-
istered gateways. Accepting packets from such is making imper-
sonation unnecessary since a jamming and wormhole attack does
suffice in this case.
Since with impersonation the same can still be achieved after taking
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this measure, further steps should be taken to secure the connection.
One way is to implement communication secured by IPSec as the
attacker in our scenario would have no way of getting hands on
the cryptographic keys, it would not make a difference if tunnel
or transport mode, authentication header or encapsulated security
payload is used. As long as the network server is configured to
not accept packets that are not secured with IPSec in some way,
the attack is unsuccessful. The same principle applies to virtual
private networks on link or transport layer. As long as some kind
of functioning authentication is used on these network layers the
described impersonation attack fails.
5.5 Make jamming harder
As shown by Aras et al. the success of jamming attacks is directly
depending on the spreading factor especially in the case of selective
jamming[1]. This can be seen in Table 5, which shows the results of
the selective jamming and wormhole attack. Using smaller spread-
ing factors leads to shorter LoRa messages which are harder to
be recorded or scanned in context of a selective jamming attack.
As this is a feature which is used when adapting to environments
subject to noise and other disturbances, a balance has to be found
in these situations.
SF packet loss
7 <0%
8 <0%
9 0-95%
10 >95%
11 >95%
12 >95%
Table 5: Capabilities of the Wormhole Jammer setup for
each SF for a packet size of 37 bytes. Successful jamming:
(>95%), mixed success: (0-95%), failure to jam: (<0%) | taken
from [1]
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we showed that there hypothetically are two possi-
ble ways to impersonate a LoRaWAN gateway using the Semtech
Packet Forwarder Protocol under the assumption of it being regis-
tered to a LoRaWAN in the manner of TTN. These ways involve
the disabling of gateways. We do this either via disconnecting the
gateway from the power source or its network connection or by
jamming messages from end devices on their way to the gateway.
We find that the absence of authentication in the protocol and confi-
dentiality of the gateway’s unique identifier are making it possible
to enact a gateway in a realistic scenario. Traces left during the
conduction of the attack are then proposed to be used for detection
in intrusion detection systems. We propose effective ways like in-
creasing physical gateway protection, redundancy in gateways and
securing the gateway-to-server connection, as well as adjusting
transmission parameters to diminish the success of jamming attacks
to counter these threats. There are still parameters which we can
not examine by interpreting protocol specifications and making use
of related works. The questions of how well the attack performs
in practice and how network servers choose the receiver of down-
link messages remain for experimental evaluation. In case of the
jamming approach, the attack also depends on how the network
server chooses the logical address of the gateway. This scenario
therefore needs tests in real environments as well. There might be
similar flaws in other protocols as LoRaWAN is not specifying a
protocol for gateway connection so manufacturers are using and
developing different protocols. In the interest of interoperability
between products of distinct manufacturers it might be helpful if an
optional standard is proposed, considering the security risks. Draw-
backs resulting from a loss of flexibility would not be present in the
optional case. Proposing such a standard however could convince
some manufacturers to use it as a default, leaving inexperienced
users less vulnerable.
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